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Reductionism is the essence of thinking and the heart of science - it is the tool that 
allows us to see the world as something other 1han a chaotic, wrilhing welte1: 
-Jonathan Gottschall, "The Tree of Knowledge and Darwinian Litermy Study" (2003 )' 
In his introduction to The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network 
Culture (2001), Mark C. Taylor, polemically opposing those of his col-
leagues in American academe who have denounced "the unholy alliance 
of technology, business, and education,"2 insists on what he terms the 
constructive alternative or the imperative of hope (echoing here, ironi -
cally, the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch's famous Prinzip Hoffnung or 
principle of hope). Such optimism, however, has never come easily to 
him, Taylor confesses. Indeed, his opening diagnosis of the postmodern 
moment of "unprecedented complexity" does suggest a much more pes-
simistic, not to say apocalyptic response: 
Awash in a sea of information that seems to have no meaning and bombarded by 
images and sounds transmitted by new media, many people have lost a sense of direc-
tion and purpose and long for security and stability. Stability, security, and equilibrium, 
I. Jonathan Gottschall, "The Tree of Knowledge and Darwinian Literary Study," Philosophy and Litera111re 
27 (2003): 262. 
2. Mark C. Taylor, The Mome111 of Complexily: Emerging Network C11/111re (Chicago: University or 
Chicago Press, 200 I) 17; hereafter abbreviated MC. 
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however, can be deceptive, for they are but momentary eddies in an endlessly complex 
and turbulent flux. Jn the world that is emerging, the condition of complexity is as irre-
ducible as it is inescapable. (MC 3) 
So we postmoderns must face, Taylor sternly exhorts, this vertiginous 
moment of complexity and "learn to live with it creatively," not de-
nounce it as "catastrophic niliilism" (MC 3). Although Michel Foucault's 
social constructivism and Jacques Deni da's deconstruction are both con-
sidered in the book, Taylor's theoretical mentor par excellence in his 
diagnostic work on postmodern complexity turns out to be Jean Bau-
drillard, "one of the first theorists to realize the ways in which informatic 
and telematic media change experience and reconstitute the world" (MC · 
65). Up to a certain point at least, Taylor seems to endorse Baudrillard 's 
theorizing about the postmodern condition - the critical point being of 
course the French philosopher 's unpalatable pessimism and melancholy, 
devoid as it is of any constructive alternatives or imperatives of hope. 
Taylor's partial endorsement comprises Baudrillardean theories like the 
so-called structural revolution of value, in which, to quote Baudrillard's 
Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993), "referential value is annihilated, 
giving the structural play of value the upper hand": 
The structurnl dimension becomes autonomous by excluding the referential dimension, 
and is instituted upon the death of reference ... Now the other stage of value has the 
upper hand, a total relativity, general commutation, and simulation - simulation in the 
sense that, from now on, signs are exchanged against each other rather than aga inst the 
real. (Quoted in M C 66-67 .) 
With this liquidation of the referential dimension Baudrillard has intro-
duced us not only to the postmodern condition of hyperreality where the 
simulation principle has displaced the reality principle, but also to the 
condition of hypercapita/ism or, to be more historically specific, the 
American boost-and-bust capitalism of the 1990s, the era of Nasdaq, the 
world 's largest electronic stock market, but also the era of digital big 
business and its sudden domino collapse. To quote Taylor 's excellent 
summary of Baudrillard's crucial argument: "When economic relations 
are mediated by blips of light transmitted through fiber-optic networks 
and displayed on computer screens, the economy and media become vir-
tually indistinguishable" (MC 68). Indeed, "hypercapitalism can thrive 
only in a world where exchange value displaces use value in a play of 
signs whose worth grows as the speed of trading increases" (MC 70). 
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Don DeLillo's latest book, his thirteenth novel , Cosmopolis (2003), 
can be read as a sophisticated, ironically apocalyptic-cum-camivalesque 
satire that deals with this very phenomenon, namely the postmodern 
moment of unprecedented complexity as embedded in American fin-de-
siecle hyper/cybercapitalism, and as embodied by the novel 's tycoon-
protagonist Eric Packer, a veritable master-of-the-universe type of 
hyper/cybercapitalist: a 28-year-old billionaire, evidently the smartest 
and coolest asset manager and currency trader on Wa1l Street, with a 
"wife of twenty-two days, Elise Shrifin, a poet who had right of blood to 
the fabulous Shrifin banking fortune of Europe and the world,"3 but also 
the owner of a 48-room, $104-million triplex apartment at the top of the 
world's ta1lest residential tower (89 storeys) overlooking the East River, 
equipped with rotating bedroom, lap pool, shark tank, borzoi pen, two 
elevators (one timed to Erik Satie music, the other to Sufi rap), and one 
could go on listing the ingredients of this surreal orgy of plutocratic Man-
hattan-lifestyle materialism and hedonism. In a 2003 interview with Paul 
Gediman, Don DeLillo comments on the significance of the historical 
and socioeconomic context in which his story about the decline and fall 
of Eric Packer and Packer Capital is situated: 
I'd been working on the book for some time before it occurred to me that the day on 
which the action occurs ought to be the last day of an era - the interval between the end 
of the Cold War and the beginning of the current period of terror [that is, the post-9/1 1 
era]. A 10-year inte1val. Essentially the 1990s. This is when culture was boiling with 
money. Capital markets surged. Multinational corporations began to seem more vital 
and influential than governments. CEOs became global celebrities. And ordinary 
people ente11ained dreams of indiv idual wealth. The Dow kept climbing, and the 
Internet kept getting swifter and more inclusive. All this began to end (as it does in the 
novel) in the spring of the year 2000. It happens faster in the novel because everything 
happens faster in the novel.4 
Thus, on an April day in the year 2000, DeLillo's latest fictional protago-
nist wakes up after another sleepless night in his apartment on First 
Avenue/47th Street and decides that he wants to get a haircut at the other 
end of 47th Street, at the barbershop of his childhood in Hell 's Kitchen. 
This decision sparks off a day-long gridlocked crosstown trip, which 
3. Don DeLillo, Cosmopolis (London: Picador, 2003) 15; hercaf1cr abbreviated C. 
4. Paul Gediman, "A Day in !he Life of the Prescnl: Don DeLillo's Cosmopolis" (ht1p://www.borders1ores. 
com/features.jsp?filc=delillo). 
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turns out to be our postmodern hyper/cybercapitalist's long day's journey 
into the night of his West-Side Manhattan origins as well as the night of 
his financial and existential apocalypse-cum-suicide. It takes place in 
Packer's white, stretched and prousted limousine, prousted here meaning 
sound-proofed, a nerdy-witty reference to the notoriously hypersensitive 
French writer Marcel Proust's cork-lined bedroom. For Packer, who is 
impressively, not to say obsessively knowledgeable about science and the 
arts as well as business, shares his author 's characteristic encyclopedic 
erudition. Packer 's CEO limo is, of course, also equipped with all kinds 
of high-tech gadgetry, including electronic screens that carry the endless 
data stream of the currency markets. Indeed, at first glance Packer 
appears to be the perfect incarnation of Taylor's optimistic vision of post-
modern man as creatively and constructively integrated with his complex 
network culture, complete with what Taylor envisages as his digital 
superman's "more radical style of incarnational thinking and practice" 
(MC 224). This is Packer 's own holistic version of such incarnational 
thinking and practice a la homo digitalis: 
He understood how much it meant to him, the roll and fl ip of data on a screen. He studied 
the figural diagrams that brought organic patterns into play, birdwing and chambered 
shell. It was shallow thinking to maintain that numbers and charts were the cold com-
pression of unruly human energies, every sort of yearning and midnight sweat reduced to 
lucid units in the financial market. In fact data itself was soulfu l and glowing, a dynamic 
aspect of the life process. This was the e loquence of alphabets and numeric systems, now 
fully realized in electronic fom1, in the zero-oneness of the world, the digital imperative 
that defined every breath of the planet's li ving bi llions. Here was the heave of the bio-
sphere. Our bodies and oceans were here, knowable and whole. (C 24) 
Packer's euphoric celebration of the zero-oneness or digital imperative of 
the postmodern business world articulates the truly paradoxical moment 
of Taylor's incamational complexity, with its spontaneous overflow of 
organic metaphors (climaxing with "the heave of the biosphere" and 
"bodies and oceans") inserted into the otherwise abstract and rigid digital 
discourse of hyper/cybercapitalism - organic images that closely re-
semble, for instance, those of a late-romantic anti-modernization organi-
cist and primitivist like D.H. Lawrence, who, in Apocalypse (193 1), 
famously proclaimed that "we ought to dance with rapture that we should 
be alive and in the flesh, and part of the living, incarnate cosmos."5 
5. D.H. Lawrence, Apocalypse (London: Penguin, 1995) 149. 
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Unlike Jack Gladney, the pathetic college professor of Hitler studies in 
DeLillo's deservedly most popular satire on the postmodern condition, 
White Noise (1984), Packer has so far performed successfully as the 
charismatic master of the new digital universe. Gladney, by contrast, 
clearly belongs to what Taylor would consider the less progressive group 
of people, for whom "the white noise of today's culture," " the much-
hyped information glut creates both confusion and a debilitating sense of 
vertigo" (MC 100). The climax of Gladney's postmodern confusion and 
vertigo is reached in the black comedy of the SIMUVAC operation where 
questions of life and death can only be answered by digital machines, 
computers, and their human or rather posthuman agents. SIMUVAC is 
short for simulated evacuation, a new state program, and after Gladney 
and his family have been evacuated (or rather evacuated themselves) due 
to a real toxic event (event being the American euphemism for cata-
strophe), Gladney points out to the SIMUVAC offi cial in charge that this, 
after all, is a real situation and a real evacuation, not a simulation. The 
postmodern SIMUVAC response goes like this: "We know that. But we 
thought we could use it as a model. "6 But there are of course problems in 
matching the messy human reality with the clean hyperreality of the 
SIMUVAC model: 
The insertion curve isn't as smooth as we would like. There 's a probability excess. Plus 
we don 't have our victims laid out where we'd want them if this was a real simulation. 
ln other words we're forced to take our victims as we find them. (WN 139) 
The SIMUVAC official's hilarious cri de coeur beautifully illustrates N. 
Katherine Hayles's cyborg nightmare in How We Became Posthuman: 
Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999), 
namely the "transformation [by cybernetic man and his machines] of 
embodied experience, noisy with error, into the clean abstractions of 
mathematical pattern,"7 the rigid machine absorbing the human being, 
"co-opting the flexibility that is the human birthright" (HWBP 105). Now 
the toxic situation happens to be particularly real for Gladney himself 
seeing that he has accidentally exposed himself to the toxic cloud when 
6. Don DeLillo, Wliire Noise (London: Picador) 139; hereafter abbreviated WN. 
7 N. Catherine Hayles, How We Became Pos1/111nw11: \/ir111a/ Bodies in Cyliem etics, Litemture, and /11for-
matics (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Pres~, 1999) 98; hereafter abbreviated HWBP. 
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he had to get out of the family car to fill the gas tank. But in the digital-
ized postmodern world only the SIMUVAC computer can decide how 
serious Gladney's condition really is, namely by displaying its "coded 
responses on the data screen," "the passage of computerized dots that 
register ... [Gladney 's] life and death" (WN, pp. 139-40). Although Glad-
ney pathetically insists on a more human response from the SIMUVAC 
agent as to whether or not "we have a [ciitical pathological] situation,'' 
the answer remains the same, namely that of the posthuman cyborg, the 
digital machine operating as a cybernetic organism devoid of human 
judgment and empathy. The SIMUVAC official himself has been reduced 
to the ontological and ethical status of an abject cyborg slave and inter- · 
preter: 
"/didn 't say it. The computer did. The whole system says it. It's what we call a massive 
data-base tally. Gladney, J . A. K. I punch in the name, the substance, the exposure time 
and then T tap in your computer history. Your genetics, your personals, your medicals, 
your psychologicals, your police-and-hospitals. It comes back p uls ing stars. (WN 141 ; 
my emphas is) 
As Hayles points out, it is no longer so clear that sophisticated judgments 
cannot be made by machines and, in some cases, made more accurately 
than by humans, but the issue is not whether or not an expert programme 
works. The real issue is "an ethical imperative that humans keep control" 
(HWBP 288) and refrain from turning over the uniquely human function 
of judgment to computers. Hayles cites Joseph Weizenbaum 's crucial 
argument in Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to 
Calculation (1976): 
What Weizenbaum's argument makes clear is the connection between the assumptions 
undergirding the liberal humanist subject and the ethical position that humans, not 
machines, must be in control. Such an argument assumes a vision of the human in 
which conscious agency is the essence of human identity. Sacrifice this, and we humans 
are hopelessly compromised, contaminated with mechanic alienness in the very heart 
of our humanity. (HWBP 288) 
But let us leave poor Professor Gladney with his modernist confusion and 
alienation and return to the truly postmodernist protagonist of Cos-
mopolis who seems so much more successfully to embody Taylor's opti-
mistic vision of homo digitalis in his moment of unprecedented com-
plexity. Let us first complete our portrait of Packer as exemplary homo 
digitalis. Despite his Lawrentian celebration/incarnation of the digital 
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imperative as an integral part of the biosphere, microcosm as well as 
macrocosm, Packer also experiences moments where he wants to tran-
scend his body: "He wanted to judge it redundant and transferable 
convertible to wave arrays of information" (C 48): 
He'd always wanted to become quantum dust, transcending his body mass, the soft 
tissue over the bones, the muscle and fat. The idea was to live outside the given lim its, 
in a chip, on a disk, as data, in a whirl, in radiant spin, a consciousness saved from void. 
(C 206) 
Packer is of course not the only postmodern homo digitalis who has fan-
tasized about digital disembodiment, downloading his brain into a com-
puter, replacing his carbon-based life with a silicon-based, etc. As Hayles 
notes, Hans Moravec had argued, in Mind Children: The Future of Robot 
and Human Intelligence (1988), that the age of carbon-based life is 
drawing to a close and that humans will be replaced by intelligent 
machines as the dominant life-form, In Robot: Mere Machine to Trans-
cendent Mind (1999), Moravec anticipates a hyperhuman future where 
machines become transcendent minds, leaving behind what Packer de-
scribed as his body mass, his muscle and fat, all of it subject to the aging 
and dying process, Instead, Moravec believes, "our failing brain may be 
replaced by superior electronic equivalents, leaving our personality and 
thoughts clearer than ever, though, in time, no vestige of our original 
body or brain remains" (quoted in HWBP 222). In The Age of Spiritual 
Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (1999), Ray 
Kurzweil, another utopian prophet of the transcendental homo-digitalis 
gospel, promises not only to satisfy Packer's yearning for digitalized dis-
embodiment, but also to cure Professor Gladney in White Noise of his 
pathological obsession with death, the "vast and terrible death" (WN, 
p.288). In Kurzweil's postbiological future there is a real digital alterna-
tive to Gladney 's (and his wife's) abuse of the Dylar tranquillizer, for 
soon immortality will no longer be a mere religious fantasy: 
Up until now, our mortality was tied up to our hardware [that is, our physical brain]. 
When the hardware crashed, that was it. For many of our forebears, the hardware gra-
dually deteriorated before it disintegrated ... As we cross the divide to instantiate our-
selves into our computational technology, our identity will be based on our evolving 
mind file. We will be software, not hardware. (Quoted in MC 221.) 
Unlike Moravec and Kurzweil, Packer refuses to go religious about his 
digital spirituality and disembodiment. He is (or at least pretends to be) a 
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cool postmodern homo ludens, Nietzchean-Derridean in his "joyous 
affomation of the play of the world and the innocence of becoming" as 
distinct from the "nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of 
play," to quote Derrrida's seminal poststructuralist manifesto "Structure, 
Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences."8 So Packer plays 
with the idea of digital transcendence and immortality, which he charac-
terizes as "semi-mythical," but then who knows: perhaps there might be 
"an evolutionary advance that needed only the practical mapping of the 
nervous system onto digital memory" (C, pp. 206-07). As an afterhought, 
Packer self-ironical1y legitimizes his futuri st wishful thjnking by adding 
the good old capitalist profit motive: "It would be the master thrust of · 
cyber-capital," he muses, " to extend the human experience toward in-
finity as a medium for corporate growth and investment, for the accumu-
lation of profits and vigorous reinvestment" (C 207). 
However, Packer, whose hyperactive mind operates or oscillates in a 
kind of progression-regression dialectic, soon tires of playing the disem-
bodiment game and returns to the primal claims of the body, no longer in 
terms of its postmodern digital incarnation, but in terms of a cosmopoetic 
paean to "the passion of the body, its adaptive drive over geologic time, 
the poetry and chemistry of its origins in the dust of exploding stars" (C 
44). 
The situation that I am refening to here, however, occurs at the very 
end of the novel where the protagonist has resigned himself to being shot 
by a fo1mer employee in his company, now transmogrified into Packer's 
demonic judge and executioner, who has been haunting, if not actually 
stalking him all day. It is in this endgame a la Beckett that Packer again 
changes his existential priorities, dismissing the quasi-religious game of 
digitalized transcendence, returning again to Hayles 's gospel of human 
embodiment, and endorsing her bottom-line argument that "human being 
is first of all embodied being, and [that] " the complexities of this embod-
iment mean that human awareness unfolds in ways very different from 
those of intelligence embodied in cybernetic machines" (HWBP, pp. 283-
84). In Packer 's own words, close to the end of the book: 
8. Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," Modern Criticism 
and Theory, ed. David Lodge (London and New York: Longman, L988) 121. 
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The things that made him who he was could hardly be identified much less converted to 
data, the things that lived and milled in his body, everywhere, random, riotous, billions 
of trillions, in the neurons and peptides, the throbbing temple vein, in the veer of his 
libidinous intellect. So much come and gone, this is who he was, the lost taste of milk 
licked from his mother's breast, the stuff he sneezes when he sneezes, this is him, and 
how a person b~comes the reflection he sees in a dusty window when he walks by. 
(C 207) 
Like Hayles, Packer is now convinced that human identity and self-con-
sciousness cannot be separated from its material substrate, its organic 
embodiment, and converted to digital data because the libidinous intel-
lect, to quote Hayles's prologue, is "a much broader cognitive function 
depending for its specificities on the embodied form enacting it" (HWBP 
xiv). Packer 's intellect cannot be dematerialized or "delibidinized" into 
pure information without being lobotomized, as it were. It is this kind of 
cybernetic lobotomization, the disembodied posthuman mind of the so-
called Information Age, complete with its apocalyptic cyborg night-
mares, that both Hayles and a spate of Matrix, Terminator and (!)Robot 
movies have been warning us against. Taylor 's creative and constructive 
optimism is, of course, indignantly opposed to such whining apocalypse-
now responses to the emerging brave new world of network culture. With 
particular reference to Hayles 's diagnosis of a posthuman condition, 
Taylor argues that the postmodern Information Age should not be "con-
ceived in terms of growing abstraction and increasing dematerialization, 
but as the complication of the relation between information and the so-
called material conditions of life" (MC 106). But however we choose to 
conceive or valorize a digitalized network culture, the fact remains that 
the world of Packer 's digital imperative is based on dramatically 
increasing abstraction and dematerialization, which must necessarily 
complicate and problematize the relation between the simulacra of digi-
talized information and the real thing or things. 
After all , it is not only the middle-aged Professor Gladney in White 
Noise that is bothered by the digital hypereality of the SIMUVAC opera-
tion. Even Packer, the young futurist state-of-the-art hyper/cybercapi-
talist in Cosmopolis, gets lost, occasionally, in the epistemological Ber-
muda triangle of Baudrillardean postmodernity where, as it were, a 
digital simulation principle has displaced the analogue reality principle. 
Take, for instance, the situation at the beginning of the novel where 
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Packer is being examined en route in his limo by Dr. Ingram. Packer is on 
his back watching his echocardiogram on the monitor, but he cannot be 
"sure whether he was watching a computerized mapping of his heart or a 
picture of the thing itself' (C 44). Another example, also from the begin-
ning of the novel, is the surreal moment of high-tech complexity when 
Packer is watching himself on the screen below the spycam and suddenly 
realizes that "he'd just placed his thumb on his chinline, a second or two 
after he'd seen it on-screen" (C 22). There is a repeat of this Twihght-
Zone phenomenon when Packer sees himself recoil in shock on the 
spycam screen and has to wait in suspension before he registers the deto-
nation that makes him recoil in shock for real. What could this possibly 
mean, he asks himself and Vija Kinski, his so-called chief of theory, who 
has joined him in the limo. I'm not sure how far Taylor would sympathize 
with Packer 's postmodern theorist, but her professional response is at 
least both creative and constructive: 
"Think of it this way. There are rare minds operating, a few, here and there, the poly-
math , the true futuri st. A consciousness such as yours, hypermaniacal, may have con-
tact points beyond the general perception." ... "Technology is crucial to civilization 
why? Because it makes us make our fate. We don 't need God or miracles or the flight of 
the bumble bee." (C 95) 
I read DeLillo's portrait of Packer as wryly sympathetic, subtly ironic, 
and the description of Packer's Twilight-Zone moments of epistemolog-
ical disorientation as pure carnivalesque satire. For an equally farcical 
demonstration - indeed, it could be deemed the classical DeLillo send-up 
of the postmodern epistemology of simulacra - see the scene at the 
beginning of White Noise where Gladney 's smart postmodern cyber-kid 
Heinrich simply refuses to believe in the evidence of his own senses, 
which indisputably tell s him that it is raining right now, because the 
radio, with its transcendent white noise of mediated news, has told him 
that the rain won't start until later that evening. In other words, DeLillo 
undoubtedly shares Baudrillard's critical position as far as the anomy 
factor of postmodern hypen-eality and complexity is concerned, in-
cluding that enervating philosophical ambivalence which makes one 
oscillate, to quote Bauclrillard 's 1984 interview with Salvatore Mele and 
Mark Titmarsh, between the " total helplessness" of a "posthistory which 
is without meaning" and "a certain pleasme in the irony of things, in the 
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game of things."9 By contrast, Taylor's response to the kind of epistemo-
logical complexity articulated, for instance, in DeLillo's Twilight-Zone 
episodes would, at least in principle, be much more sympathetic, witness, 
for instance, the following observation by Taylor: 
The information revolution occurs when infonnation turns on itself and becomes self-
reflexive. This turn has been made possible by new electronic and telematic technolo-
gies, through which information acts on infon11ation to fmm feedback loops that gene-
rate increasing complexity. (MC 106) 
In this light, Packer 's scary experience of some kind of parallel virtual 
reality could very well be the result of a cybernetic feedback loop in the 
limo's sophisticated computer equipment. But ifl read Taylor's argument 
correctly, we (and Packer) should not get too scared, but instead celebrate 
such paranormal phenomena as sublime moments of unprecedented com-
plexity. My own problem with this position is the same problem that 
Weizenbaum tackles in Computer Power and Human Reason, namely the 
existential or existenti alist problem of judgment as the essence of human 
agency and identity. If we turn that function over to the so-called intel-
ligent machines, the cyborgs, we have, in Hayles's phrase, become post-
humans. Consequently, I also have a serious problem with Taylor's con-
ception of "human subjectivity or selfhood" as not necessarily entailing 
"the prior existence of mind or any kind of pwposeful agent" (MC 205, 
my emphasis). Instead, Taylor 's postmodern mind is conceived as a kind 
of autopoietic system that organizes itself, but with no "self," no con-
sciously organizing agent within the system, hence also devoid of any 
ethical imperative, in principle giving carte blanche to, say, laissez-faire 
hypercapitalism a la Enron or Parmalat: "Instead of intentionally formed 
patterns through which experience is screened, the mind is generated by 
complex interrelations among patterns that emerge spontaneously" (MC 
205). In Taylor's postmodern network culture, the human self is being 
reduced to "a node in a complex network of relations," in the midst of 
which "I [that is, Taylor himself] can no more be certain where I am than 
I can know where or when the I begins and ends" (MC 231). To a 
Sartrean existentialist like myself, this postmodern version of Emerson's 
transparent eyeball spells the posthuman cyborg nightmare diagnosed by 
9. Salvatore Mele and Mark Titmarsh, "Game with Vestiges," Baudrillard Live: Selected /11ter11iews, ed. 
Mike Gane (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 95. 
r 
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Hayles. But the underlying epistemology of that position may also serve, 
I believe, as a nice illustration of Baudrillard 's memorable diagnosis of 
American postmodernity in America ( 1988), namely in terms of an epis-
temological "clash of the first level (primitive and wild) and the ' third 
kind' (the absolute simulacrum)": 
There is no second level. This is a situation we [that is, we Europeans ! find hard to 
grasp, since this is the one we have always privileged: 1he self-reflexive, self-mirroring 
level, the level of unhappy consciousness. 10 
One of the many voices in DeLillo's fi ction that would protest against 
Taylor 's conception of the postmodern self is the 57-year-old, olive- · 
skinned, no-nonsense Nick Shay in Underworld (1997), who does not 
"accept this business of life as a fiction," but claims to live "responsibly 
in the real": 
I hewed to the texture of collected knowledge, took fa ith from the solid and avai ling 
stuff of our experience. Even if we believe that history is a workwheel powered by 
human blood - read the speeches of Mussolini - at least we've known the thing 
together. A single narrative sweep, not ten thousand wisps of disinformation. 11 
True, the situation of Eric Packer, the digital superman and hypercapi-
talist in Cosmopolis~ may be a bit more complex, but, as carnivalesque 
satirist and moralist, DeLillo arguably shares Shay's philosophical 
moment of simplicity in the way he has designed the single narrative 
sweep of Packer 's endgame. As his former employee, now his self-
appointed judge/executioner, Richard Sheets aka Benno Levin (the sym-
bolic name of ethnic victimization and alienation) calmly explains, 
Packer 's hypercapitalist system had first made him, as employee, a 
"helpless robot soldier," then, when he got fired, just "helpless" (C 195), 
with panic attacks "from holding in [his] anger all these years" (C 202). 
In his view, Packer "need[sJ to die no matter what": 
"I have my syndromes, you [that is, Packer] have your complex. Icarus falling. You did 
it to yourself. Meltdown in the sun ... You have to die for what you think and act. For 
your apartment and what you paid for it. For your daily medical checkups. This alone. 
(C 202) 
I 0. Jean Baudril lard, America, trnns. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1989) 104. 
11 . Don Delillo, Undenvor/d (London: Picador, 1998) 82. 
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Icarus falling: Like Icarus, Packer must fall because of his hubristic arro-
gance, including his egomaniacal desire to beat the unprecedented com-
plexity of the yen in the globalized postmodern currency market, losing, 
in the process, the "Packer Capital's portfolio" as well as "his personal 
fortune in the tens of billions" (C 121). Packer himself must somehow 
have realized that his hyper/cybercapitalist egomania, with its "huge 
ambition" and "lack of remorse" (C 191), needed to be counterbalanced 
by spells of transcendental meditation, but his practice of "meditat[ing] 
for hours," only sent him, Sheets/Levin ruefully notes, "deeper into [his] 
frozen heart" (C 198). In order to defrost that frozen heart, Packer must 
return to what I have called the primal claims of the body, he must be 
reincarnated. Throughout the novel, sex has served as Packer's favoured 
embodiment therapy: during his crosstown odyssey in the limo, Packer 
has sex with his longtime lover and art consultant, various employees, 
and his wife (in that order), but at the end of his apocalyptic odyssey, 
when suddenly experiencing "an enormous remorseful awareness," a 
sensation "called guilt" (C 196), Packer chooses physical pain to embody 
his sense of guilt. He shoots himself in the hand, which goes hot, "all 
scald and flash," "pervertedly alive in its own little subplot" (C 197). 
Incidentally, the function of agonizing embodiment as a kind of cognitive 
psychotherapy closely resembles the crucial role of acute physical pain 
and self-mutilation in David Pincher's notorious film Fight Club (1999), 
based on Chuck Palahniuk 's apocalyptic first novel from 1996. Another 
interesting comment on the existential desire or need for painful embodi-
ment as a postmodern phenomenon is provided by Slavoj Zizek, who, in 
his 9/11 book Welcome to the Desert of the Real (2002), suggests that, 
ironically or dialectically, "the 'postmodern' passion for the semblance 
[that is, the passion for "the pure semblance of the spectacular effect of 
the Real"] ends up in a violent return to the passion for the Real," "a des-
perate strategy to return to the Real of the body."12 Zizek cites, as a key 
example, the phenomenon of cutters, that is, "people, mostly women, 
who experience an irresistible urge to cut themselves with razors or oth-
erwise hurt themselves": 
Far from being suicidal, far from indicating a desire for self-annihilation, cutting is a 
radical attempt to (re)gain a hold on realiLy, or (another aspect of the same pheno-
12. Slavoj Zizek, Welcome ro 1//e Desert <~f'the Real (London: Verso, 2002) 10; hereafter abbreviated WDR. 
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menon) to ground the ego fi rmly in bodily reality against the unbearable anxiety of per-
ceiving oneself as nonexistent. Cutters usually say that once they see the warm red 
blood flowing out of the self-inflicted wound, they feel alive again, firmly rooted in 
reality. (WDR, p.10) 
Penitent Packer, however, is not a typical cutter in th at his desire for 
bodily reality is linked to a desire for self-annihilation. He has lost the 
elan vital of the hyper/cybercapitalist, "the predatory impulse, the sense 
of large excitation that drove him through hi s days," and asks himself 
what he could possibly "want that was not posthumous" (C 209). 
DeLillo 's endgame with Packer turns out to be as grotesque and carniva-
lesque as anything else in the novel. Packer the hubristic postmodern, · 
posthuman homo digitalis is brought to poetic justice through a human-
izing reincarnation, comprising a fragile body with an asymmetrical 
prostate, reinforced by his masochistic "cutter" act, that is, his shooting 
"a hole in the middle of his hand" (C 197) as a kind of self-stigmatiza-
tion, followed by the virtual reality of his own impending death, another 
Twilight-Zone scene (actually lifted from an authentic Twilight-Zone 
episode, "A Most Unusual Camera"). Packer, "alive in real space" (C 
209), is watching his own body "facedown on the floor" (C 205) as regis-
tered by the refined electron camera inside his watch and displayed on 
the crystal. Later he sees himself first in an ambulance, with drip-feed 
devices, then in a vault with the identification tag Male Z, "the designa-
tion for the bodies of unidentified men in hospital morgues" (C 206). The 
all-too-human response of Packer, who is still waiting to be shot in real 
space, is a grotesquely sublime one-liner: "O shit I'm dead" (C 206). The 
postmodern simulacrum has once more, if not replaced, at least preceded 
the real thing, fulfilling, in this case, Dracula's ancient dream of a world 
where the vampiric Un-Dead have exterminated the real Dead. 
Sic transit the glorious moment of postmodern complexity, according 
to DeLillo, one of the few contemporary American writers who, as Frank 
Lentricchia notes in "The Ame1ican Writer as Bad Citizen" (1991), "con-
ceive their vocation as an act of cultural criticism; who invent in order to 
intervene; whose work is a kind of anatomy, an effort to represent their 
culture in its totality." 13 To Lentricchia's pertinent observation I would 
13. Frank Lentricchia, "The American Writer as Bad Citizen," lmrod11ci11g Don Delillo, ed. Frank Lentric-
chia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991) 2. 
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like to add that, as a philosophical critique of American postmodemity, 
DeLillo 's writing could also be seen as a fictional implementation of 
what Alain Badiou, in /J~finite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philo-
sophy (2003), stresses as "the singular and iITeducible role of philo-
sophy," especially in a postmodern world marked not only by com-
plexity, but also by speed (the speed of technical change, communica-
tions, transmissions etc.), namely the role of what might be called philo-
sophical retardation: "its thinking is leisurely, because today revolt re-
quires leisureliness and not speed." 14 The prime objective of such 
leisurely thinking, Badiou argues in his own philosophical revolt against 
" the postmodern orientation" with its "polyvalence of meaning" and "in-
finite regression of quibbling," is " the return to ethics," which again 
"necessitates the return of an unconditional principle" (IT, pp. 44, 46, 
54). In other words, the postmodern moment of complexity must be com-
plemented by the philosophical moment of simplicity, the moment of 
some unconditional truth or truths. But the category of truth must be 
reconstructed, Badiou insists, as the truth of singularity, that is, singu-
larity both in terms of the event and the agent because "the singular is 
always, in the final analysis, the true centre of any decision which 
counts" (IT 53). It is, I suggest, this moment of truthful simplicity and 
singularity that Elie Packer is attempting to negotiate in his endgame, 
against all the postmodern odds. 
14. Alain Badiou, l11ft11ite Thought: 'frurh and the Re111m ro Philosophy, trans. Oliver Feltham and Justin 
Clemens (London and New York: Continuum, 2003) 5 1; hereafter abbreviated IT. 
